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IMPROVED METRICS FOR WORKPLACE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES: 
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Abstract 
 
Many debates surround systems for resolving workplace disputes. In the United States, 
traditional unionized grievance procedures, emerging nonunion dispute resolution systems, and 
the court-based system for resolving employment law disputes have all been criticized. What is 
missing from these debates are rich metrics beyond speed and satisfaction for comparing and 
evaluating dispute resolutions systems. In this paper, we develop efficiency, equity, and voice as 
these standards. Unionized, nonunion, and employment law procedures are then qualitatively 
evaluated against these three metrics.  
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 The design and operation of workplace dispute resolution systems are longstanding issues 
in human resources and industrial relations. But what are the metrics for evaluating workplace 
dispute resolution systems? For human resource managers to design effective dispute resolutions 
systems, for union leaders to advocate certain systems, for policymakers to promote or restrict 
various systems, and for researchers to know what to analyze we must identify the important 
dimensions for comparing dispute resolution systems. There is rich theoretical and empirical 
research on workplace dispute resolution that has significantly advanced our understanding of 
many issues, but what’s missing is a common set of metrics for evaluating and comparing 
workplace dispute resolution procedures (Bemmels and Foley 1996; Lewin 1999; Lipsky, 
Seeber, and Fincher 2003; Olson-Buchanan and Boswell, 2007). 
 To this end, then, we extend Budd’s (2004) analyses of the objectives of the employment 
relationship and assert that the metrics for evaluating and comparing systems of dispute 
resolution are efficiency, equity, and voice. This analytical framework applies to dispute 
resolution systems in a wide variety of contexts—disagreements over employment conditions, 
workplace rights, legal rights outside of the workplace, marital dissolution, and global trade 
agreements, for example. As a first application, this paper focuses on workplace rights disputes.
1
 
The Lack of Good Dispute Resolution Metrics 
 Among dispute resolution mechanisms for workplace rights disputes, unionized 
grievance procedures have been researched to the greatest extent. Studies have analyzed the 
determinants of grievance initiation (Bemmels 1994; Bacharach and Bamberger 2004), attitudes 
towards and satisfaction with grievance procedures (Bemmels 1995; Bemmels and Lau 2001), 
grievance processing speed (Lewin and Peterson 1988; Ponak, et al. 1996), the determinants of 
grievance outcomes (Meyer and Cooke 1988; Klaas 1989), the relationship between grievance 
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activity and individual and organizational performance (Kleiner, Nickelsburg, and Pilarski 1995; 
Lewin and Peterson 1999; Boswell and Olson-Buchanan 2004), and a host of other related 
issues. And yet there is a lack of accepted metrics for evaluating grievance procedures. 
 The two primary measures used to date for assessing grievance procedures are speed and 
satisfaction. The speed literature typically analyzes how long it takes to resolve grievances and at 
what step of the process grievances are resolved. The satisfaction literature typically surveys 
parties to the grievance procedure to measure their perceptions of grievance procedure 
effectiveness. At best, these are imperfect and incomplete measures of grievance procedure 
effectiveness. By itself, how quickly a dispute is resolved tells us very little about the 
effectiveness of the resolution (Bemmels and Foley 1996; Lewin 1999). In fact, empirical 
research finds that the speed of a resolution is not related to satisfaction with and attitudes 
towards grievance procedures (Clark and Gallagher 1988; Gordon and Bowlby 1988). 
Satisfaction has also been shown to be confounded by a host of other factors such as union 
satisfaction, union commitment, employer commitment, and dual commitment (Fryxell and 
Gordon 1989; Bemmels 1995). As such, Bemmels and Foley (1996: 375) conclude that 
“effectiveness is difficult to interpret from measures reflecting the operation of grievance 
procedures” while Lewin (1999: 154) concludes that “there is a lack of consensus among 
researchers about what exactly constitutes grievance procedure effectiveness.”  
 These conclusions—and implicit calls to action—apply equally well to nonunion 
workplace dispute resolution procedures. As just one example of the imperfect metrics in this 
domain, research on the due process elements of nonunion procedures is quite limited (Feuille 
and Chachere 1995; Colvin 2003a, 2003b). The lack of good metrics within areas of workplace 
dispute resolution research means a lack of metrics for undertaking comparative analyses across 
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different procedures. In fact, Lewin (1999: 158) criticizes the research on unionized grievance 
procedures because it has “failed adequately to consider the effectiveness of grievance 
procedures in relation to the effectiveness of other forms of workplace conflict resolution.” So 
there is a clear need to identify and develop critical dimensions that can be compared across all 
types of workplace dispute resolution procedures.  
Efficiency, Equity, and Voice 
 Budd (2004) argues that the objectives of the employment relationship are efficiency, 
equity, and voice. Efficiency is the effective, profit-maximizing use of scarce resources and 
captures concerns with productivity, competitiveness, and economic prosperity. Equity entails 
fairness in both the distribution of economic rewards and the administration of employment 
policies. Voice is the ability of employees to have meaningful input into workplace decisions 
both individually and collectively. Efficiency is a standard of economic or business performance; 
equity is a standard of treatment; voice is a standard of employee participation. Budd (2004) 
further analyzes alternatives for workplace governance, union strategies, and comparative 
industrial relations systems against the standards of efficiency, equity, and voice. Applying this 
framework to dispute resolution procedures provides a rich analytical framework in which 
researchers, practitioners, and policymakers can analyze and compare dispute resolution systems 
along the dimensions of efficiency, equity, and voice.
2
 To this end, we first define efficiency, 
equity, and voice in the context of dispute resolution procedures. The remaining sections of the 
paper qualitatively analyze unionized, nonunion, and employment law dispute resolution 
procedures for resolving rights disputes against these standards. 
 An efficient dispute resolution system is one that conserves scarce resources, especially 
time and money. Systems that are slow and take a long time to produce a resolution are 
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inefficient; systems with shorter timeframes that produce a relatively quick resolution are 
efficient. Similarly, dispute resolutions systems that are costly are inefficient. Costs can stem 
from various features of a dispute resolution system such as the need for high-paid experts or the 
involvement of numerous participants.
3
 For workplace dispute resolution systems, another aspect 
of efficiency is the extent to which the system fosters productive employment. Preventing strikes 
or providing unconstrained managerial decision-making are elements of dispute resolution 
systems that promote this aspect of efficiency. Costs might also be non-financial—disputants 
may suffer psychological costs and disrupted social relations. These non-financial costs may, in 
turn, negatively affect organizational efficiency and individual careers.  
 Equity in the context of dispute resolution systems is a standard of fairness and unbiased 
decision-making. Outcomes in an equitable system are consistent with the judgment of a 
reasonable person who does not have a vested interest in either side, and are supported by 
objective evidence. Equity also requires that the outcomes provide effective remedies when 
rights are violated. Individuals in similar circumstances should receive similar treatment and face 
similar, though not necessarily identical, resolutions. Moreover, an equitable system treats the 
individual participants with respect, sensitivity, and privacy. Equity also includes the existence 
of safeguards—such as the ability to appeal decisions to a neutral party—and transparency to 
prevent arbitrary or capricious decision-making and enhance accountability. An equitable dispute 
resolution system also has widespread coverage independent of resources or expertise and is 
equally accessible irrespective of gender, race, national origin, or other personal characteristics. 
 The voice dimension of dispute resolution systems captures the extent to which 
individuals are able to participate in the operation of the dispute resolution system. This 
dimension includes important aspects of due process such as having a hearing, presenting 
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evidence in one’s defense, and being assisted by an advocate if desired. Voice can also include 
the extent to which individuals have input into the construction of the dispute resolution system 
and into specific resolutions. As equity and voice might both be casually described as fairness or 
justice, it can be tempting to combine the two dimensions. But equity and voice are different and 
require separate analyses. The equity dimension focuses on outcomes whereas the voice 
dimension focuses on participation in the process. A dispute resolution system can be equitable 
(by producing unbiased outcomes) but lack voice, or can include voice but be inequitable. For 
example, a system in which a neutral, just decision-maker decides disputes unilaterally could 
have a significant measure of equity, but lack voice. This distinction becomes particularly 
important in analyzing dispute resolution systems in nonunion workplaces where the question 
arises of how to categorize the benevolent paternalistic employer who treats employees very 
well, yet retains strong control over the process and outcome of any complaints or disputes.   
 An alternative approach for comparing workplace dispute resolution systems is to use 
distributive and procedural justice. Efficiency, however, is not well captured in the distributive 
and procedural justice framework, yet is an important consideration in evaluating the functioning 
of a dispute resolution system. Moreover, distributive and procedural justice focus on how 
individuals are treated in terms of outcomes and process. In our framework, equity captures how 
people are treated (outcome-wise and procedurally), voice captures participation. In a procedural 
justice framework, individuals participate to the extent that this promotes fairness. In a voice 
framework, individuals participate because participation is intrinsically important, regardless of 
whether it is fair or not. In some models of procedural justice, procedural justice can be achieved 
unilaterally. This is never the case with voice.    
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 The metrics of efficiency, equity, and voice provide an analytical framework for 
analyzing and comparing different dispute resolution systems. Following Hyman’s (2001) 
“geometry of trade unionism” and Budd’s (2004) “geometry of the employment relationship”, 
this analysis yields the “geometry of dispute resolution procedures.”4 As such, the baseline 
union, nonunion, and employment law dispute resolution systems are located in Figure 1 based 
on the extent to which they are efficient, equitable, and provide voice. These relative locations 
will become apparent as the various procedures are discussed in the remainder of the paper. 
Disagreements over these locations are welcomed as the major contribution of this three-
dimensional framework is providing the coherent basis for such debates. 
 Figure 1 is intended as a convenient tool for considering and comparing various systems 
of dispute resolution. We recognize that more precise analyses require identifying and measuring 
specific components of efficiency, equity, and voice. Table 1 therefore provides an initial 
decomposition of the three metrics with some suggested measures. Recent research on workplace 
dispute resolution has examined a number of these measures as important indicators of the 
performance of procedures. For example, comparisons of employment arbitration and litigation 
have examined speed, cost and award outcomes as indicators of the relative efficiency and equity 
advantages of these procedures (Delikat and Kleiner 2003; Eisenberg and Hill 2003). Other 
research examining employment arbitration has investigated biases in decision-making 
(Bingham 1997) and consistency of outcomes (Bingham and Mesch 2000; Wheeler, Klaas, and 
Mahony 2004; Klaas, Mahony, and Wheeler 2006) as important equity indicators. In 
constructing a due process index to compare nonunion grievance procedures, Feuille and 
Chachere (1995) included equity measures, such as the independence of the decision-maker, and 
voice measures, such as the ability to have representation at hearings. Comparing outcomes of 
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nonunion grievance procedures, Colvin (2003b) used voice and equity measures including the 
rate of appeals and employee success rates. Each of these studies, and other similar ones, indicate 
the value of these specific measures, which capture aspects of the broader metrics of efficiency, 
equity, and voice. Previous studies, however, have not combined individual measures into broad 
metrics and an overall theoretical framework for comparing and evaluating workplace dispute 
resolution procedures. The remainder of this paper focuses on a qualitative analysis of efficiency, 
equity, and voice; further development of specific quantitative measures is left to future research. 
Unionized Workplace Procedures 
 The dominant dispute resolution system in U.S. unionized workplaces is a formal 
grievance procedure with binding arbitration. However, in response to concerns with the cost, 
timeliness, and quasi-legal nature of grievance arbitration, the unionized sector is also 
experimenting with expedited arbitration and grievance mediation systems (Feuille 1999; Colvin, 
Klaas, and Mahony 2006). All three systems can be usefully analyzed against the metrics of 
efficiency, equity, and voice. 
Grievance Arbitration 
 Grievance arbitration, or rights arbitration, involves a hearing before a third-party neutral 
(the arbitrator) over a dispute over a provision of a union contract; the arbitrator’s subsequent 
binding ruling resolves the dispute. Relative to court proceedings in the U.S. legal system or to 
strikes, the grievance arbitration dispute resolution system is efficient (Zack and Dunlop 1997). 
It is less costly than both of these options and can also enhance productive efficiency by 
preventing work stoppages and by identifying areas of conflict. But relative to less formal 
procedures, grievance arbitration is criticized for being lengthy (perhaps a year from grievance 
filing to arbitrator decision) and costly (perhaps $10,000 or more per hearing) (Feuille 1999). 
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The quasi-judicial nature of grievance arbitration with a strong reliance on past precedents can 
also be criticized for inhibiting flexibility and change. This system is also reactive and backward 
looking to determine guilt or innocence rather than forward looking and proactive to solve 
problems (Lewin 2005). As such, there are efficiency concerns with grievance arbitration. 
 Grievance arbitration is evaluated highly on the equity dimension. The threat of a binding 
decision by an outsider provides labor and management with the incentive to settle grievances 
fairly and respect due process throughout the process (Zack and Dunlop 1997). Formal hearings 
and reliance on credible, objective evidence are central features of the U.S. grievance arbitration 
system. The binding decisions by neutral arbitrators provide effective mechanisms for remedying 
unfair treatment in the workplace. Workers found to be fired without just cause, for example, are 
reinstated with back pay. Moreover, these decisions commonly rely heavily on past arbitration 
precedents and past workplace practices. As a result, there is a high degree of consistency in 
decision-making across cases so workers who have similar grievances in similar circumstances 
receive similar treatment. This consistency is an important component of equity. 
 With respect to voice, the evaluation of grievance arbitration is mixed. As grievance 
arbitration systems are negotiated rather than imposed, labor and management have a high 
degree of voice in establishing the process (Zack and Dunlop 1997). Moreover, both sides 
participate equally in all steps of unionized grievance procedures and the various parties are 
represented by attorneys or other advocates as desired in arbitration proceedings. There are 
strong traditions of fulfilling basic due process rights such as being heard and presenting 
evidence. On the other hand, the bureaucratic nature of traditional grievance procedures and the 
importance of stewards, union officials, and attorneys rather than individual workers is attacked 
by critical scholars for stifling rank and file involvement and voice (Stone 1981; Klare 1988). 
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Though partly mitigated by the duty of fair representation, union carriage of grievances may also 
reduce employee voice when the interests of the union and the individual grievant differ. Lastly, 
voice is stronger in the process than in the outcome because a third party (an arbitrator) 
unilaterally imposes the final resolution to the dispute (though the parties have control over the 
outcome at the lower stages of the grievance procedure).  
Expedited Arbitration and Grievance Mediation Alternatives 
 Efficiency concerns underlie experimentation with expedited arbitration and grievance 
mediation alternatives to grievance arbitration. Expedited arbitration reduces costs and fosters 
faster resolution of grievances by avoiding written briefs, transcripts, perhaps lawyers, and 
detailed, written decisions. Abbreviated hearings, reduced reliance on precedent, and a more 
limited opportunity to present grievances, however, might reduce equity and voice. 
Alternatively, the inclusion of a grievance mediation step before arbitration can also help avoid 
arbitration and its associated delays, costs, and legal formalities. Relative to an arbitration-only 
process, there is the possibility that equity suffers because of a reduced role of neutral labor 
arbitrators in ensuring consistency across grievances, but since the parties retain control of the 
resolution in mediation, any inconsistencies are agreed to by the parties. Moreover, the parties 
retain the right to pursue arbitration when mediation fails to provide a satisfactory resolution. 
With respect to voice, grievance mediation enhances voice because the parties are agreeing to a 
negotiated settlement of the dispute.  
Nonunion Workplace Procedures 
 While nonunion grievance procedures may lack the highly developed institutionalized 
structure of union grievance procedures, they cover a much larger segment of the overall 
workforce and are an increasingly important mechanism for regulating workplace conflict. As a 
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result, it is important to examine the relative advantages and disadvantages of the different types 
of nonunion grievance procedures. The metrics of efficiency, equity, and voice provide a useful 
way for comparing unionized dispute resolution systems with nonunion systems, and also for 
comparing the various nonunion alternatives with each other. 
Unilateral Management Discretion and Open Door Policies 
In the absence of a formal dispute resolution procedure, the response to employee 
complaints is left to unilateral management discretion. This situation clearly strongly favors 
efficiency by providing for quick and cheap resolutions and promotes productive efficiency by 
allowing unconstrained management decision making. The equity dimension is weaker as fair 
treatment depends on managerial roles, values, attitudes, and personal senses of fairness and is 
therefore uncertain and highly variable (Karambayya and Brett 1989; Colvin 2001). There is no 
hearing at which evidence is formally presented nor is there a neutral decision-maker to consider 
the positions of each side and render an adjudication of the dispute. With respect to voice, 
employees are essentially supplicants, hoping to receive the favor of management in response to 
their request. Open door policies might also include: the ability of employees to bring complaints 
to a manager outside of the immediate chain of command; policies discouraging retaliat ion 
against employees who make complaints; and provisions to keep track of and follow-up on 
complaints. But the resolution of the employee’s concern is still up to the initiative of the 
manager responding to the complaint (Colvin, Klaas, and Mahony, 2006). The result is a system 
that, in the geometry of dispute resolution, has very high efficiency and very low equity and 
employee voice.
5
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Management Appeal Procedures 
Whereas open door policies typically lack a formal structure for appealing grievances, 
more formal nonunion grievance procedures often include multi-step appeal procedures that 
superficially resemble the multi-step grievance procedures of unionized workplaces, but at each 
stage of the procedure, managers are the decision-makers. Employees also do not have 
independent representation, except perhaps the assistance of an HR staffperson (Feuille and 
Chachere 1995; Colvin 2004). Formal hearings with presentation of evidence, examination of 
witnesses and presentation of arguments are relatively rare (Feuille and Delaney 1992). These 
management appeal procedures involve some enhancement of equity relative to open door 
policies, especially through the formal structure of procedures and provision of specific steps for 
appealing unfavorable decisions (Colvin, Klaas, and Mahony, 2006). But retention of 
management control over decision-making under this type of procedure represents a major due 
process deficiency and weakness from the equity perspective (Colvin 2001). Grievance 
procedures with management decision-makers offer relatively little from an employee voice 
perspective. Control over the design, rules, and decision-making under this type of procedure are 
retained by management and lack employee voice. In addition, the lack of independent 
representation of employees under the vast majority of these procedures limits the extent of voice 
in the process of resolving grievances. Thus, the overall geometry of this type of procedure 
consists of some limited enhancement of equity relative to open door policies, little in the way of 
employee voice, and an emphasis on efficiency. 
Peer Review 
Under nonunion peer review procedures, employees sit on a panel that decides grievances 
(McCabe and Lewin 1992; Colvin 2003b, 2004). A typical panel might consist of two managers 
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and three employees who are peers of the complainant, with the key characteristic being that the 
peer employees comprise a majority of the members of the panel. Peer review panels are often 
introduced as part of a union substitution strategy in order to provide employees with a stronger 
alternative to union grievance procedures than the typical nonunion procedures that use only 
management decision-makers (Colvin 2003a). In other words, peer review procedures shift the 
emphasis between efficiency, equity, and voice. Some efficiency is sacrificed due to the more 
elaborate hearing procedures, examination of witnesses, and documentary evidence. However, a 
key benefit of using a peer review panel from an equity perspective is the greater independence 
of the decision-makers from management (Colvin 2003b). Given that peer employees are a 
majority on the panel, they have the ability to overrule management decisions that they view as 
unfair. At the same time, it should also be recognized that management establishes the rules 
under which the panel operates, which may result in limitations from an equity perspective, such 
as if management includes a rule limiting the panel to deciding whether company policies were 
correctly applied, rather than allowing general considerations of fairness (Colvin 2004). Peer 
review procedures also include a stronger employee voice element than typical nonunion 
grievance procedures because employees can present their case to a panel.  
Ombudspersons 
An ombudsperson is a resource outside of ordinary organizational hierarchies for 
employees to bring complaints and problems and obtain assistance in resolving them (McCabe 
and Lewin 1992; Lipsky, Seeber, and Fincher 2003). Depending on the situation, the 
ombudsperson may play a role in resolving a dispute akin to that of a mediator or more in the 
role of an advocate for the employee. The cost of devoting specific personnel and resources to 
the ombudsperson’s office represents a limitation of this type of procedure from an efficiency 
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perspective (Lipsky, Seeber, and Fincher 2003). On the other hand, the ombudsperson may 
enhance efficiency by promoting more cooperative relations between employees within the 
organization (Reuben 2005). From an equity perspective, the strength of the ombudsperson is 
that they can get employee problems addressed by managers who would be less likely to respond 
to an employee acting on their own. However the lack of formal procedures and open hearings 
under an ombudsperson procedure also creates a lack of guarantees of equal treatment and 
uncertainty over the degree to which employee interests are protected  From a voice perspective, 
an ombudsperson may help give employees a more effective voice in pursuing workplace 
complaints. At the same time, ombudspersons are employees of the organization and so the 
degree to which they represent a genuinely independent voice on behalf of employees seeking 
their assistance can be questioned (Colvin, Klaas, and Mahony 2006). Although both peer review 
and ombudsperson’s offices may have deficiencies in the areas of equity and voice relative to 
union grievance procedures, they are noteworthy attempts to alter the geometry of dispute 
resolution in the nonunion workplace to increase the emphasis on equity and voice despite some 
cost in efficiency.  
Employment Law Procedures 
 A special set of workplace rights disputes pertain to alleged violations of statutory 
employment laws or common law principles. In many countries, these employment law disputes 
are resolved through specialized labor courts or industrial tribunals that feature expert decision-
makers and simple, expedited procedures. In contrast, in the United States, claims of 
employment law violations are usually resolved through the general court system. This 
employment litigation system strongly emphasizes equity and provides for a strong, albeit 
relatively formal, structure for employee voice. But dispute resolution through jury trials courts 
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is extremely expensive relative to other systems and raises concerns of both access to the system 
and waste of resources. Partly in reaction to these concerns, there has been growing efforts to use 
alternative dispute resolution procedures, including both mediation and arbitration, to resolve 
employment law disputes. 
Employment Law Litigation  
 The great strength of the system of litigation in the courts is its strong focus on equity in 
resolving disputes. In order to ensure that all relevant information is considered in the decision-
making process, extensive pre-trial procedures allow for discovery of written documents and 
deposition of witnesses (Reuben 2005). At the trial itself, both the employee and the employer 
are able to fully test the claims of the other side through presentation and cross-examination of 
witnesses. To enhance the fairness of the decision, a jury of twelve unbiased people is 
empowered to render a verdict on the claim, with an experienced judge present to resolve any 
questions of law. To further ensure equity in the process, any errors of law in the trial can be 
appealed to higher courts to be resolved by a panel of highly experienced judges. At the same 
time, employer-side complaints have been raised about the employment litigation system from 
an equity perspective. In particular, concerns have focused on the lack of consistency in awards 
and danger of large, “runaway” jury verdicts. Whereas equity may be commonly viewed as an 
employee-centered concern, employment litigation provides an example where employers have 
also advanced arguments that are framed around the metric of equity in evaluating a dispute 
resolution procedure.     
 The downside to the strong equity protections of the litigation system is the resulting 
limitations of the system from an efficiency perspective. While the elaborate pre-trial discovery 
procedures of litigation maximize the likelihood that all relevant information comes to light 
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before trial, this also requires extensive time and effort and may involve sifting through large 
amounts of irrelevant or unimportant information. Resolving workplace rights disputes through 
the U.S. court system is anything but speedy (Eisenberg and Hill 2003). In addition to the direct 
costs to the parties of attorneys and expert witnesses, there are substantial costs borne by the 
public of providing judges and the lost productivity of citizen jurors who are required to be 
absent from their own jobs for the period of the trial.  
 From the perspective of voice, the litigation system has both strengths and weaknesses. A 
key strength is the ability of a plaintiff employee to obtain a full hearing of an employment law 
claim against an employer (Reuben 2005). The system, quite literally, ensures the employee will 
get their day in court and the opportunity to have their positions fully presented. At the same 
time, the complexity of legal rules requires that a professional attorney be retained to oversee and 
present the case. Complex legal rules can also often channel cases to focus on issues different 
from or in addition to the underlying interests that initially motivated the dispute. For example, 
an employee who is dismissed after many years of loyal service may be motivated to bring suit 
in order to give voice to feelings that the employer has violated the employee’s trust, yet in 
litigation the case may need to be framed as an age discrimination case to provide a legal basis 
for the claim. Another voice aspect of the litigation system is provided by the jury, which serves 
as a voice of the community or the public. In particular, the ability to award punitive damages 
allows the jury to give voice to the view that an employer has engaged in conduct that far 
exceeds the boundaries of acceptable behavior. An additional voice aspect of the litigation 
system is that this is a public system in which the laws and rules governing the system are 
established through the democratic process (Reuben 2005).  
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As with equity, some concerns with the litigation system have been raised from an 
employer-side perspective in the area of voice. In particular, criticisms of the American litigation 
system often raise the specter of out of control juries with little appreciation of the realities of 
operating a business awarding inflated damages to plaintiffs at the behest of money-seeking trial 
attorneys (Olson 1997). Although arguments can be presented as to the accuracy or lack thereof 
of this image, the key point to recognize is that the criticism is partly directed at a perceived lack 
of employer voice in the litigation system. This reinforces both the importance of considering the 
voice metric in evaluations of dispute resolution process and the need to recognize the existence 
of employer, as well as employee, considerations in the area of voice.      
Employment Law Arbitration 
The costs and inefficiencies of the litigation system have been a driving force in the 
increasing use of alternative dispute resolution procedures to resolve employment law disputes in 
the United States. Employment law arbitration holds significant potential advantages over 
litigation from an efficiency perspective. Rather than requiring a judge, twelve-person jury, and 
various court officers, arbitration typically occurs before a single arbitrator. Arbitration 
procedures are generally simpler and more expedited than litigation procedures. In particular, 
pre-trial discovery procedures are much less extensive in arbitration than in litigation. All of this 
serves to reduce the time and cost involved in bringing a claim through arbitration compared 
with litigation, creating greater efficiencies in the system (Estreicher 2001; Hill 2003). Whereas 
State and Federal court cases take an average of around two years to adjudication, a sample of 
employment discrimination claims arbitrated under the auspices of the American Arbitration 
Association averaged only 276 days to adjudication (Eisenberg and Hill 2003).  
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Employment law arbitration, however, can be strongly criticized from an equity 
perspective. The simplification of procedures in arbitration that enhances efficiency has been 
criticized as sacrificing equity through the elimination of due process protections (Stone 1996). 
In particular, the more limited pre-trial discovery procedures of arbitration may seriously limit 
the ability of plaintiff employees to gather information necessary to support their claims. This 
concern is heightened in employment law cases because much of the relevant information, such 
as personnel records and files or witnesses who are employees, is under the control of the 
employer. The use of professional arbitrators as decision-makers has also been criticized from an 
equity perspective as creating a danger that arbitrators will tend to be biased towards employers, 
who are likely to be repeat players in the system, over employees, who are more likely to be 
single-time players in the system (Bingham 1997). In fact, empirical research shows that 
employment arbitrators are significantly less likely to rule in favor of employee complainants 
than were comparison groups of labor arbitrators, peer review panelists, and jurors, though they 
may be more likely to favor employee complainants than managerial decision-makers in other 
nonunion procedures (Bingham and Mesch 2000; Colvin 2003b; Wheeler, Klaas, and Mahony 
2004). Another concern with arbitrators as decision-makers is that they will be much less likely 
than juries to make large punitive damage awards to punish egregious employer misbehavior 
(Colvin 2001). On the other hand, some argue that employment arbitration may have an equity 
enhancing effect by lowering costs and thereby making it easier for employees to bring claims 
than with litigation (Estreicher 2001). More efficient and equitable outcomes might also result 
because compared to broadly-trained judges and inexperienced juries, employment law 
arbitrators can have specialized knowledge of employment law and a greater sensitivity towards 
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the nature of the employment relationship and the standing of individual employees in the 
dispute resolution system (Estreicher 2001). 
Issues of voice have received less attention in evaluations of employment arbitration. 
Voice is present in the ability of the employee participate in the selection of the arbitrator and to 
present their case. The main weakness of employment arbitration from the standpoint of voice is 
that the employer controls the development and adoption of the procedure (Colvin 2003a). In this 
respect, employment arbitration compares unfavorably with labor arbitration, where voice is 
provided by joint union and management negotiation of the contractual rules under which 
arbitration occurs. Lastly by shifting enforcement of public employment laws from the public 
forum of the courts to the private forum of arbitration, use of employment law arbitration may 
reduce the degree of voice provided through the democratic political process (Stone 1996). 
Employment Law Mediation 
Employment law mediation provides another alternative to litigation for resolving 
employment disputes. In mediation, a neutral mediator helps resolve the dispute by facilitating 
negotiation of a settlement between the parties (Lipsky, Seeber, and Fincher 2003). Employment 
law mediation increases efficiency relative to litigation and arbitration by encouraging quicker, 
less costly resolution of disputes (Bingham 2004). From the perspective of equity, mediation has 
the advantage that resolutions consist of consensual agreements between the employee and 
employer. As a result, the concerns about bias in decision-making that have been directed at 
employment arbitration are diminished with employment law mediation. From a voice 
perspective, employment law mediation has the advantage that the employee has a voice in both 
the process and result of dispute resolution (Reuben 2005). If the employee does not agree with 
the proposed settlement, they can simply decline to reach an agreement. However, it is of 
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concern that some research suggests that in employment mediation occurring as a pre-arbitration 
step in employer-promulgated procedures, many employees do not have a representative, or only 
a non-attorney representative such as a family or community member or a fellow employee 
(Colvin 2004). The danger here is that employees without legal representation may not realize 
that they are giving up possible legal claims in a mediation settlement.  
Although space limitations do not permit us to do so here, a similar analysis could be 
extended to other procedures that focus on facilitating settlements between the parties rather than 
providing a binding determination of the outcome of the dispute. For example, Early Neutral 
Evaluation and minitrials are two examples of alternative procedures that have been used to 
resolve legal claims through processes designed to facilitate settlement by the parties. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
A range of choices exist of possible procedures for resolving workplace disputes, with 
important resulting implications for employment systems. Although these choices have sparked 
strong debates, consistent dimensions for comparing procedures are often incomplete or lacking 
entirely. To evaluate the available choices, there is a need for metrics for comparing dispute 
resolution procedures that go beyond the limited and perhaps flawed dimensions of speed and 
satisfaction that are so prevalent in the literature. As such, we argue that the objectives of 
efficiency, equity, and voice provide rich metrics for evaluating and comparing workplace 
dispute resolution procedures. In the analysis presented here, we have shown how efficiency, 
equity and voice can be used to compare unionized and nonunion workplace procedures, as well 
as employment law procedures. Translating our analyses to the triangular framework introduced 
above yields the locations in the geometry of dispute resolutions procedures shown in Figure 2. 
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The usefulness of the diagrammatic triangular approach is in providing an easily accessible 
platform for comparing different systems.  
 Unionized grievance arbitration has a relatively strong provision of voice and especially 
equity, but cost, speed, and flexibility issues reduce its efficiency. In comparison, expedited 
arbitration performs better on the efficiency dimension because of reduced costs and increased 
speed, but at the expense of a degree of equity and voice. The inclusion of a pre-arbitration 
mediation step improves efficiency with only minor trade-offs with equity and voice. In 
comparison to union procedures, nonunion grievance procedures tend to score higher on 
efficiency and lower on equity and voice. The favoring of efficiency is seen most strongly in 
open door policies that provide little protection of equity or voice. Other nonunion options 
involving management appeal, peer review, and ombudspersons each represent an attempt to 
provide greater equity and voice. In comparison, the U.S. employment litigation system has 
greater elements of equity and voice, but is evaluated less favorably in terms of efficiency. 
Employment law arbitration and mediation schemes can usefully be seen as altering the relative 
mix of efficiency, equity, and voice.  
Our analyses focus on understanding and comparing workplace dispute resolution 
procedures, but the framework developed here can also be used to design desired procedures. For 
example, pluralist industrial relations thought emphasizes balancing competing interests (Budd, 
Gomez, and Meltz 2004). Figure 2 and the accompanying comparative analyses can be used by 
policymakers to promote specific workplace dispute resolution procedures that balance 
efficiency, equity, and voice. Other normative frameworks could similarly use these analyses to 
design procedures that fulfill other desired mixes between efficiency, equity, and voice. In fact, 
the trajectory of the development of major dispute resolution options within the union, nonunion, 
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and employment law arenas largely reflect a struggle among practitioners to find their desired 
relative levels of efficiency, equity, and voice. For unionized procedures, expedited arbitration 
and grievance mediation represent efforts to remedy limitations in efficiency in grievance 
arbitration. The development of peer review and ombudsperson procedures represent efforts to 
remedy the lack of equity and voice in open door or management appeal procedures. Amongst 
employment law procedures, both employment mediation and arbitration represent efforts to 
shift the balance relative to litigation, which strongly emphasizes equity and voice over 
efficiency.  
Even if one disagrees with the specific analyses herein, such debates underscore the need 
for metrics and illustrates the utility of the efficiency, equity, and voice framework for analyzing 
and designing dispute resolutions procedures—in and out of the workplace. The challenge for 
future research is measuring and implementing this rich framework. 
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Notes 
 
1 Rights disputes are disagreements over whether someone’s rights have been violated—rights 
granted through an employee handbook, a union contract, or an employment law. Such disputes 
should not be confused with disputes over conflicts of interest such as higher wages (the 
employees’ interest) versus lower labor costs (the employer’s interest). 
2
 In Budd’s (2004) analysis, efficiency is primarily an employer concern while equity and voice 
are largely employee interests. As applied to dispute resolution, however, these associations are 
not as strong. For example, efficient workplace dispute resolution methods that yield timely and 
inexpensive settlements serve both employer and employee interests.  
3
 A costly dispute resolution procedure such as a strike or lengthy court trial might be efficient if 
these costs provide incentives for the parties to avoid such disputes. These incentives are 
important aspects of dispute resolution systems for interest disputes, but are less important for 
rights disputes.  
4
 In none of these applications is the use of the term “geometry” intended to imply mathematical 
precision; rather, it is intended to capture the comparison of different properties within a three-
dimensional space. 
5
 It should be noted that in all of the nonunion procedures, employers have a high level of voice 
in that they control how a procedure is structured and have the fullest participation rights. But 
because of the imbalance between employer and employee voice, we rate these systems as weak 
on the voice dimension. A union-controlled grievance procedure—such as in the pre-1930s craft 
union model of grievance arbitration (Stanger 2001)—is similarly rated as weak on the voice 
dimension because of the imbalance between employer and employee voice. 
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Table 1. Three Metrics for Dispute Resolution 
Dimension/Definition Dispute Resolution Concerns 
Efficiency  
Effective use of scarce resources Cost 
Speed 
Promotion of productive employment 
Equity  
Fairness and justice Unbiased decision-making 
Effective remedies 
Consistency 
Reliance on evidence 
Opportunities for appeal 
Protections against reprisal 
Voice  
Ability to participate and affect 
decision-making 
Hearings 
Obtaining and presenting evidence 
Representation by advocates and use of experts 
Input into design and operation of a dispute 
resolution system 
Participation in determining the outcome 
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Figure 1. The Geometry of Dispute Resolution 
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Figure 2. The Geometry of Dispute Resolution: Putting It All Together 
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